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1This article was originally published in Physics, Logic and History edited by 
W. Yourgrau and A. D. Breck, New York, Plenum Publishers, pages 129-139. 
This article is also reprinted in SWAN Vol. 9. he impact of science upon society and upon the individual is today of such 
n order that any view called unscientific by authoritative scientists or 
hilosophers of science has a rather reduced chance of being studied seriously 
ithin the intellectual environment that they dominate. Among such views I 
ave particularly in mind philosophies, including life philosophies, generally 
lassed as not empirical or not rational. I include here Spinoza, the Pyrrhonist 
keptic, and the trends inspired by the Dane Søren Kierkegaard and by the 
ermans G. W. F. Hegel and Karl Marx. 
egel has been a particularly favoured Prügelknabe of scientists and “tough 
inded” philosophers, in the terminology of the pluralist William James. And 
ven staunch admirers and careful students of Hegel, at the moment I have 
specially J. N. Findlay in mind,1 will concede that Hegel made incursions 
nto scientific discussions, writing enough mythology to fill volumes. But an 
pen-minded, slow reading of the preface to Phenomenology of Spirit, 
specially pages 19–26 in the Philosophisce Bibliothek edition of 1952, now 
asily available, convinces us that Hegel had a strong, very original, and very 
omprehensive vision of the basic relation between man, the universe, and 
istory. There is nothing unscientific in this vision or in any other of 
omparable primordial status, because it in no way supports or contradicts 
cientific hypotheses. It is ascientific; it is beyond science and not 
ntiscientific. It is a great task of the philosophers to verbalize and 
onceptualize such visions so that others can see humans, the universe and 
orld history with the colouring that is specific to a particular vision. 
hilosophers must invade all major fields of science, not in order to back up 
ertain hypotheses and ridicule others, but to help us see how the colouring 
lso covers or applies to our scientific knowledge. Even Hegel seems 
ometimes to have had the intention to “keep off” evaluations of particular 
cientific hypotheses but, alas, his inhibition seems to have frequently left 
im. This, however, should not prevent one from trying to enjoy his vision. It, 




natural world” (Lebenswelt in opposition to Welt der Wissenschaft) that must 
be understood if logical, physical, and historical reality are somehow to be 
compared. 
 
The world of personalities, of consistent personal perspectives, is today still a 
colourful world, immensely satisfying to contemplate for its unbelievable 
variety. It would be disastrous to use the prestige of science to lay down limits 
and exclude some worldviews, for instance religious, or squarely antireligious, 
as being refuted by science, or to call them irrational or intellectually 
dishonest because they do not fit in with the definite philosophy of science. 
After all, the carefully formulated results of genuine scientific research are 
largely neutral toward differences in comprehensive worldviews. (And why 
should philosophers of science be less modest than the scientists whose work 
they exploit?) 
 
It has been predicted that it will be difficult to build bridges, for instance 
between discussions among logicians where “existence” is a key term, and 
discussions involving the same key term among scientists and philosophers 
influenced by Heidegger, Sartre, or Marcel. Such bridges will be and are 
today built in environments where admirers of Sartre, Heidegger, and others 
take advanced courses in symbolic logic, empirical semantics and read with 
steady delight and occasional approval the works of Sir Karl Popper—
environments where, too, some representatives of the toughest sciences have 
successfully mastered the labyrinth of Heideggerian terminology. It is, after 
all, not so bad when helped along by friends who are very well acquainted 
with empirical and rational approaches. 
 
I know one such environment intimately, and am convinced that if all 
fundamental views or theories about physical reality were to be considered in 
a critical atmosphere, it could be done only in such an environment. As 
regards top achievements, I am more pessimistic. They stem often from 
centers of learning showing great dogmatism and narrow mindedness. (Hegel, 
Heidegger, and Wittgenstein did not know empirical trends from the inside!) 
Our problem today, however, is not so much to push for great academic 
achievements, as to assist in the integration of knowledge in personal 
outlooks, to stress inwardness and colourful multiplicity of views and 
attitudes. Creative imagination must be taken as good care of in environments 
of empirical and rationalist philosophy of science as in the cosmological 
environments of a Gamow or Bondy. 
 
In what follows, I invite you to consider a conceptual framework adapted to a 
very liberal attitude toward various philosophical approaches, provided they 
start from a sufficiently deep and comprehensive level and refrain from 
trafficking in particular scientific hypotheses. 
 
All non-contradictory fundamental (philosophical, metaphysical) positions 
(systems, points of view) have the same non-zero status of validity (are 
equivalid, are acceptable at one time). 
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Open-minded, constructive research having such positions as an object 
consists of clarifying and increasing the scope of them, rather than trying to 
reduce their number.  
 
The terms “validity” and “fundamental” need (even in this preliminary 
discussion) some elucidation: 
 
Truth (as agreement with reality) is a kind of validity. The kind of validity of a 
fundamental position is not truth, it belongs to the class of validities such that 
p and not p may both be valid, though p may not be both valid, and not valid. 
 
The degree of fundamentality of a position is relative to the status of the 
discussion and research at any given moment. Roughly, those propositions, 
rules or norms will be ultimate which make up the last links in 
argumentations. If mathematics, as suggested by Lakatos, has no foundations 
outside itself, certain purely mathematical propositions and rules will be 
fundamental to any comprehensive position. 
 
I shall next introduce some further conceptual tools that I and some 
others have found convenient to use in analysis of positions, and which 
have also been used in empirical research. They cluster around two 
concepts “definiteness of intention” and “preciseness.” 
 
If somebody utters a sentence T0 with truth—or validity—claim, the 
definiteness (not necessarily the “depth”) of cognitive meaning is limited by 
the set of discriminations he makes. The network of discriminations in the 
form of distinctions in meaning is not a stable one. Thus, if I say that this ship 
is of 10,000 tons, or that pi and h (Planck) are constants, I may have a very 
crude idea of what I intend to say, but it may be definite enough for the 
purpose at hand. An expert at Lloyd’s Register of Shipping for example, will 
have a high or sharp definiteness of intention that can only be conveyed to 
outsiders by means of perhaps 500 words. As regards the term “constant,” my 
network or grading of discriminations may be at least temporarily refined by 
reading articles such as those of Professor Yourgrau about different usages of 
the term “constant,” or by trying to compete with Quine, Chruch, and Mates 
introducing mathematical logic, or by trying to prove some fairly general 
theorems about constants. Degrees of definitions of intention may be, and 
have been, experimentally measured and compared, but that is a complicated 
affair.2 
 
Economy of thought requires that we work with a definiteness of intention 
commensurate with the requirements of the task or the problem confronting us 
at any time. Problems in quantum physics confronting physicists, who do not 
aim at making radical advances, do not require a high definiteness of intention 
regarding the significance of the symbols in, let us say, the Heisenberg 




subscribe to the Copenhagen interpretation. Insofar as the so-called 
Copenhagen interpretation is formulated as a scientific interpretation, only a 
small fraction of researchers and teachers in physics in Western countries 
seem to make the discriminations necessary to single out different 
interpretations. 
 
So much about the concept of definiteness of intention. The other concept, 
“preciseness,” can be introduced as follows: A sentence T1 is more precise 
than a sentence T0, if there is at least one interpretation to which T0 admits, but 
T1 does not, and there is no interpretation admitted by T1, which is not also 
admitted by T0. 
 
Preciseness thus defined is a transitive relation and definiteness of intention 
can be measured with reference to chains of “precizations” T0, T1, T11, T111 . . ., 
(and T112, T113 . . .) are more precise than T11 (and T12, T13 . . .) and T11 more 
precise than T1. If a person fails to discriminate at the level of T111, but 
succeeds at the level of T11, then T111 is said to be a transintentional 
precization to his set of discriminations. 
 
The following diagram illustrates the various concepts introduced. 
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If an intention can be located in the area B (of the diagram), but not in A, 
another in A but not in B, the first is more definite than the second. The level 
of (verbalized) definiteness of intention is proportional to that of preciseness. 
The B- field of discrimination is more precise than the A- field.  
 
Levels of preciseness and definiteness of intention 
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Applying these concepts to the pluralism thesis, or view, I suggest that we 
place the talking about systems, the metaphilosophical utterance at the T0-
level. It is a philosophically relatively neutral level because of its low level of 
discriminations (in relation to philosophical conceptualizations). Any 
sufficiently vigorous effort to exact a delimination of the pluralism thesis 
inevitably plunges it into the arms of a definite system or family of systems. 
This is easily seen considering that the above formation of pluralism includes 
the words “non-contradictory,” “fundamental,” “position,” and “validity.” 




ambiguous words must reveal the philosophical idiosyncrasies of the author, 
and therefore ruins communicability of the pluralism, making it only 
understandable within a definite philosophical camp. Pluralism is in some 
sense only an ad hoc and rough position, “exposed to wind and weather” and 
awaiting its ultimate destruction. But what is not ad hoc? 
 
Pluralism does not rule out that ultimately there must be one truth. But except 
in matters of little concern, or in practical affairs, many of us are never able to 
satisfy ourselves for any reasonable length of time with any definite solution 
to even one major theoretical question. And why not let this colour one’s 
stand toward ultimate positions? 
 
It is a near universal belief among philosophers that non-philosophers 
or more specifically, ordinary men, men of common sense and 
youngsters who have not yet heard of philosophy, are naïve realists in 
ontology, that they think truth consists of agreement with reality, and so 
on.  
 
If empirical evidence is considered of any importance in this field of 
easy speculation, it supports an opposite conclusion. When they are 
directly or indirectly stimulated toward formulating philosophical 
opinions, I have found that youths from 14 to 18 years old express in a 
crude way, with low definiteness of intention, very different ontologies, 
epistemologies, and other positions of fundamental import. If “It is true 
that the earth is round” is taken as T0, some will discriminate between 
precizations of “true” at the T1-level, but the T2-level will be 
transintentional. Thus they do no more that suggest different theories of 
truth, they do not (of course) work them out in a precise fashion. 
 
But under suitable experimental conditions, for instance by bringing the 
philosophically innocent youngsters together in groups for prolonged and 
repeated discussions, their opinions on fundamentals are gradually expressed 
more precisely and in greater detail. There is little tendency toward the 
adoption of one single basic view as long as adults representing authority are 
kept at a distance. 
 
In environments where certain trends of philosophy dominate, gifted young 
students tend to adopt the current opinions and attitudes, although an 
impressive teacher may induce some of the students to accept his views, even 
if they are looked down upon within the dominating circle, but that is an 
exception. In any case, the narrowing down of variation is not due to any 
intellectual inferiority of certain basic views, and certainly not to clear-cut 
falsification. Intellectually, there seems to be a decline in variation due to 
absence of systemic development of various intensively incompatible views 
on the professional level (the “monolithic” tendency). The “amateurs,” kept 
isolated from authoritarian adults, show a far greater tolerance of ambiguity 
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(as this term is used in psychology), and also the courage to leave debates on 
fundamentals open. 
 
These are, of course, empirical hypotheses, and they have only in part been 
subjected to research. But results obtained point in that direction. 
 
Finally, what is the relation of philosophical pluralism to the contemporary 
discussion on physical reality? 
 
Listening to what some physicists authoritatively tell us, pluralists get into 
trouble: to accept as pure physics what they tell us must today be accepted—
and not as conceptions derived from some basic conceptions, entails accepting 
certain fundamental positions as the only possible ones. Thus, Leon Rosenfeld 
insists that the development of physics entails certain views in the logic of 
concepts. If this logic, which is more akin to ontology in the usual sense, is 
expanded, it fits Hegelian basic positions, not others. Those of us who are not 
physicists are used to and inclined to accept at face value what we are told is 
pure physics, and we are tempted to look at certain philosophies as falsified by 
physics. This means giving up pluralism. Listening to other physicists 
however, we begin to suspect that physicists have succumbed to a gigantic 
non-sequitur, and are offering us positions on false grounds. We shall look 
with interest for evidence that different groups of contemporary physicists, all 
presumably very competent, have incorporated different positions in their so-
called physics. This is happily the case. We should therefore be in a position 
to discriminate “pure physics” from “philosophical physics,” looking for pure 
physics in what is common to all physicists today. Philosophical physics 
would be physics explicitly developed within the frame of reference of a 
fundamental position. 
 
Pure, unphilisophical physics is, of course, strictly speaking nonexistent. It is a 
fiction. However, a position akin to Pierre Duhem’s may well be developed. 
(Akin to Duhem, because his doctrine that the succession of good physical 
theories makes them approximate to a natural classification of real objects 
cannot, if accepted at face value, avoid colouring the physicists’ criteria of a 
good theory. And this makes him take a kind of realist, philosophical position, 
thus leaving his “pure” physics.)  
 
The pluralist in me is interested in the further elaboration and clarification of 
the early Copenhagen interpretation, still retained by Heisenberg, and its 
radicalization in the direction of Berkeley’s idealism. Of value to pluralism, 
too, is the idea of Leon Rosenfeld and others, that there is something 
dialectical, in the Hegelian or Marxian sense, in the doctrine of 
complementarity. In his famous Tokyo lecture (1960) this eminent, but 
vehemently antipluralist physicist, Rosenfeld made quantum physics part of a 
far from trivial metaphysics.3 Rosenfeld there said, among other things: 
“Complementarity denotes the logical relation of quite a new type, between 
concepts which are mutually exclusive, and which therefore cannot be 




which nevertheless must both be used in order to give a complete description 
of the situation.” Logicans have not, as far as I know, been inspired to work on 
this quite new type of logical relation. The main reason, I think, is that the 
environment of logicans (in the West) is unHegelian or even antiHegelian: 
The conception of “concept” and of “logic” implicit in Rosenfeld’s views does 
not belong within the mainstream of formal logic. The conception belongs to 
the Hegelian framework of Rosenfeld’s philosophical physics.  
 
Neither the Heisenberg nor the Rosenfeld philosophy has today the 
preciseness required for univocal location within the network of fundamental 
positions. However, I hope that some philosophically trained Copenhagen 
people will take up the problem of how to find careful, precise formulations. 
 
But what, now, has the development of physics in the last decades to do 
with philosophical pluralism? 
 
The developments have convinced me, firstly, that fundamental advances in 
physics are made by physicists for whom physics is not a formidable set of 
tricks of the trade, but whose thinking proceeds within the framework of 
ultimate positions and philosophical interpretations of the terms and formulae 
used in physics. In time, the philosophy of these physicists is “rubbed off,” 
because physical practice does not require preciseness in fundamentals. 
 
Secondly, that the positions among creative physicists are and will continue to 
be mutually inconsistent, and that efforts to narrow down the sources of 
diverse philosophical inspiration constitute not only a methodological but a 
general cultural evil. The fight between idealist and realist conceptions is 
barren except for increasing the explicitness, comprehensiveness, and 
consistency of each kind of incompatible conception. 
 
Thirdly, recent development convinces me that certain members of the 
Copenhagen School, notably Leon Rosenfeld, have argued in an antipluralist 
way which illustrates all the dangerous aspects of the narrowing down of such 
sources of inspiration. The early Bohr, the late Bohr4 (after discussions with 
the Russian physicist Fock), Heisenberg, and Rosenfeld, have suggested five 
different interpretations of certain formulae. What is needed is not so much a 
reduction of the number but a deepening and clarifying of issues. It is doubtful 
that as much as five fundamental positions are involved, but there are at least 
more than one. 
 
Certain physicists have started on the pluralist road—I am tempted to refer to 
the little book by Bernard d’Espagnat, Conceptions de la Physique 
Contemporaine. (Hermann, Paris 1965). It does not go very far towards 
making positions precise, but the atmosphere is sufficiently detached and 
unauthoritarian to give each position a chance of an at least initially 
sympathetic hearing. 
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Let me append to this propluralist sermon a remark that might (mistakenly) be 
taken as antipluralist: 
 
Dr. Vigier embraced the idea of a theory of hidden variables before he could 
describe a single possibility of experimental confirmation. He has been 
unjustly criticized for this among some physicists, but on behalf of all pluralist 
philosophers of the world, I would thank him: we have, as philosophers, little 
or no chance at all of creating alternatives in physics, and are thus rather 
helpless when physicists point to certain interpretations as inevitable and 
definitive. Courageous physicists who suggest new paths even before it is seen 
what they might lead up to, experimentally, are therefore especially welcome. 
Vigier was inspired, however, by a form of dialectical materialism, in a way 
that would scarcely be possible if he were a pluralist in philosophy. This 
underlines the curious fact that it is next to inconsistent to wish both for 




1  J. N. Findlay’s Hegel, A Re-examination, Allen & Unwin, 1958, is herewith 
recommended to colleagues who feel strongly anti-Hegelian, but who would like to 
find out why Hegelian thinking (in a wide sense) has a greater following than any 
other today. See also Findlay’s “The Contemporary Relevance of Hegel” in his 
Language, Mind and Value, Allen & Unwin, 1963. A direct confrontation of Hegel’s 
conception of knowledge with Bohr’s (early) interpretation of quantum physics is 
carried out by A. Kojeve in his Hegel. Versuch einer Vergegenwärtigung seines 
Denkens, transl. Kohlhammer 1958. –After this piece of propaganda for the reading of 
Hegel I ought perhaps to mention that I personally have never found anything of value 
in Hegel, although sometimes I have assisted young Hegelians in getting a foothold in 
my own environment. No pluralist milieu without Hegelians! 
2  The concepts of “Definiteness of Intention” and “Preciseness” are introduced and 
discussed in my Interpretation and Preciseness, Oslo University Press, Oslo 1953. 
Now Vol. 1 in the Selected Works of Arne Naess, Dordrecth, The Netherlands: 
Springer, 2005. 
3  See p. 6 in the mimeographed version, 1961.  
4  See “Niels Bohr in the darkness and light of Soviet philosophy,” Inquiry, Vol. 9, 
1966. 
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